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updates from the regional human rights systems
European Court of
Human Rights
European Court of Justice strikes
down Security Council Blacklist
The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ruled that the implementation of the United
Nations Security Council’s Al-Qaida
blacklist without access to an effective
remedy violates human rights. In 1999, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1267,
which requires all states to freeze assets
and ban travel of individuals and entities
associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban.
The European Union (EU) passed a series
of regulations implementing the resolution
and its subsequent amendments. The list
of individuals and entities subject to the
sanctions is created by the Al-Qaida and
Taliban Sanctions Committee, comprised
of representatives from each member of
the Security Council. Because affected
individuals have no standing to challenge
who is put on or taken off the list, the ECJ
held on September 3, 2008, in Kadi and
Al Barakaat v. Council of the European
Union that the EU regulations violated
their fundamental rights to be heard, to
respect for property, and to an effective
remedy which form part of the EU law.
The crucial issue before the court was
whether the ECJ had the power to review
the legality of EU regulations. The Court
of First Instance, the judicial body from
which Kadi appealed, held that the ECJ
generally does not have this power. This
is because EU regulations only implement
obligations arising from the UN Charter, which by virtue of Article 103, has
primacy over the law of the European
Community.
The ECJ approached this sensitive matter by carefully circumscribing its power
of review to the conformity of the EU
regulations with the legal order of the
European Community. The ECJ stressed
its inability to review the lawfulness of
Security Council resolutions themselves.
Nevertheless, the ECJ held that the fact
that obligations were imposed by an international treaty “cannot have the effect of
prejudicing the constitutional principles
of the EC treaty, which include the prin-

ciple that all Community acts must respect
fundamental rights” and that “measures
incompatible with respect for human rights
are not acceptable in the Community.” The
ECJ positioned the effects of international
law in the legal order of the European
Community below the “very foundations
of the Community legal order, one of
which is the protection of fundamental
rights.” It thus implicitly refused to give
Article 103 of the UN Charter an effect of
overriding all conflicting rules.

On May 27, 2008, the court held that
the removal of an alien with a serious
mental or physical illness to a country with
inferior treatment facilities may raise an
issue under Article 3, but only in “a very
exceptional case, where the humanitarian
grounds against the removal are compelling.” The criteria for an “exceptional
case” are the severity of the illness, availability of the treatment, and the prospect
for family and social support in the target
country.

The Court must be hailed for giving
precedence to the protection of human
rights over any possible conflicting international obligations. It is hoped that the
judgment will have an impact on the work
of the Security Council, which should
amend its procedures to be more respectful of human rights. Otherwise, it runs the
risk of undermining the effectiveness of
its decisions in instances like Kadi, where
states may be unwilling to fully implement
such decisions due to conflicts with the
protection of human rights.

The Court did not find such exceptionality in the present case. Although it
accepted that the applicant’s life and life
expectancy would be adversely affected
if she were returned to Uganda, the Court
still found that she was not critically ill
when the case was decided and that the
lack of access to medical treatment and
support in Uganda was speculative.

Deporting Severely Ill Violates
Article 3 Only in ‘Exceptional
Circumstances’
In N. v the United Kingdom, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) upheld a decision to deport
an asylum seeker with AIDS back to
Uganda. Despite the unavailability of vital
antiretroviral treatment in her home country, the removal of Ms. N. would not violate Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (the Convention).
Ms. N. was diagnosed with AIDS shortly
after arriving in the United Kingdom (UK)
in 1998. Although Ms. N.’s condition
was stabilized after intensive antiretroviral
treatment, a 2001 expert report determined
that without continuing regular treatment,
her life expectancy would be less than one
year. Ms. N. claimed that the acute physical and mental suffering, followed by an
early death in Uganda due to the lack of
adequate medical treatment, would violate
Article 3’s prohibition against inhuman or
degrading treatment.
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The Court should be hailed for recognizing the possibility that removal of
a seriously ill alien might violate Article
3; however, the Court’s application of
the Article to this case was questionable.
First, the Court was satisfied with the
statement that antiretroviral medication
is generally available in Uganda, but it
did not consider whether the applicant
herself would have access to it. Indeed,
the three dissenters pointed to the fact that
the available evidence clearly proved that
Ms. N. would not have access. Second,
the reliance of the Court on the fact that
the applicant’s condition was stabilized is
dubious and at odds with the case law. It is
not the time proximity between deportation
and the suffering that is decisive, but the
foreseeability of the prohibited treatment
as a consequence of the deportation.

Additional European Court of
Human Rights Cases
In Vajnai v. Hungary the Court found
that a criminal conviction for wearing
a red star symbol violated the freedom of
expression. The Court held that, because
not all uses of the symbol connote communist totalitarian rule, a flat ban on the
symbol would be “too broad.” On the contrary, in Soulas v. France, the Court upheld
criminal sanctions against the author of a
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book that argued that Muslims were gradually overtaking Europe, stating that the
book incited hatred and violence towards
Muslim communities.
In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands the
Court explored the issue of internal flight
alternative, a contested area of refugee
law. The supporters of the concept argue
that if persons are able to escape persecution by moving into a different part of
their country, they cannot claim refugee
status abroad. The Court held that as a precondition for relying on an internal flight
alternative, certain guarantees have to be
in place. “The person to be expelled must
be able to travel to the area concerned, gain
admittance and settle there, failing which
an issue under Article 3 may arise.”
In Maslov v. Austria the Grand Chamber
found that Article 8 prohibits an expulsion
from the country of immigrant juvenile
offenders because of effects on their family life. It stressed that, for juveniles, “very
serious reasons are required to justify
expulsion.” Nevertheless, it was careful to
leave the door open especially for cases of
particularly violent offenders.
In Budayeva v. Russia, the Court held
that the positive obligations of states under
the right to life in Article 2 extend also to
situations of natural disasters. Thus, the
Court found Russia responsible for deaths
in a 2001 mudslide for failing to take measures against an imminent and identifiable
natural hazard. Russia’s request for a referral to the Grand Chamber is still pending.
In Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, the
Grand Chamber ruled 13 to four that the
extraordinarily high ten percent electoral
threshold imposed in parliamentary elections in Turkey is excessive, but does not
violate the right to free elections in the
specific circumstances of the case. The
primary mitigating circumstance was that
individual candidates were not subject to
the threshold and, in practice, strategies
such as candidates running independently
rather than on a party list of which they
were members were successful in achieving seats in the Parliament. The dissenters
severely criticized the Court for relying on
informal ways around the threshold.
Ghosts of the past haunted the Court in
Kononov v. Latvia and Korbely v. Hungary.
Both Konovov, a member of Red Partisans
during World War II, and Korbely, a member of Hungarian communist army during

the 1956 Hungary uprising, were convicted
of killing civilians. In both cases, the Court
found, by a close margin, a violation of
Article 7 (no punishment without law)
because the convictions could not be based
either on domestic law or on the right interpretation of international humanitarian law
(IHL). The core of the judgments lies in
the analysis of a status of a civilian under
IHL. In Konovov, the Court held that men
who received rifles and grenades from the
German military administration and sided
with them could not be regarded as civilians under the laws and customs of war as
codified in the Hague 1907 Regulations. In
Korbely, the Grand Chamber found that the
victim was a member of armed group of
insurgents, carried a handgun secretly and
did not signal in an unequivocal way an
intention to surrender when caught. Thus
the victim did not fall under any category
of a protected person under the Common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The
Latvian government has already indicated
a will to have the case reviewed by the
Grand Chamber.

Inter-American System
Haiti Violated Former
Prime Minister’s Rights
The Inter-American Court on Human
Rights (the Court) issued judgment in Yvon
Neptune v. Haiti on May 6, 2008, marking its first decision on Haiti. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(the Commission) submitted the case to
the Court in December 2006 due to the
failure of the Haitian government (Haiti)
to respond to the recommendations of the
Commission. The Court found that Haiti
violated Neptune’s rights as protected
by the American Convention on Human
Rights, including judicial protections, personal liberty, and personal integrity. The
Court, however, did not find a violation of
Article 9 (freedom from retroactive laws).
Neptune served as Haitian prime minister amidst a political crisis that spanned
March 2002 to March 2004 in the government of former president Bértrand Aristide. Following a February 2004 armed
confrontation in the city of La Scierie
(Saint-Marc) resulting in many deaths, the
government fell and an interim government
was established. Days before, Neptune visited La Scierie as prime minister and urged
police forces to impose order in the city.
Soon after the visit, the Saint-Marc Court
of First Instance ordered Neptune’s arrest
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for ordering and participating in the ‘massacre’ at La Scierie. Although Neptune did
not receive direct notification, he turned
himself in after hearing about the order
on the radio in June 2004. Neptune was
detained for twenty-five months in two
Haitian prisons. In April 2007, an appellate
court held that the order against Neptune
had been made by a court without jurisdiction. The Haitian constitution stipulates
that state agents can not be judged by ordinary courts. The matter was directed to the
High Court of Justice, where it remained
pending at the time of this decision. Neptune was granted temporary humanitarian
release in July 2006.
Haiti asserted that the alleged violations
occurred prior to the establishment of the
current government. The Court held that
difficult conditions did not justify failure
to comply with obligations of the Convention. Haiti argued that because of the separation of powers, the executive was not
responsible for the judiciary’s failures. The
Court, however, asserted the international
legal principle of unity of the state, holding
Haiti as a whole responsible for violations,
regardless of which branch of government
directly caused them.
The Court found Haiti in violation of
Neptune’s judicial protections under Articles 8 and 25 as a result of the unjustifiable
delay of access to justice, prolongation
of uncertainty, and lack of judgment by a
competent judge on the merits. First, the
Court held that Haiti failed to give Neptune
sufficient notice of the charges against him
until September 2005 when he had been
detained for over a year. Second, the Court
noted that Haiti had detained Neptune for
more than two years upon the order of
a tribunal lacking jurisdiction over him.
Third, his case was mandated to the High
Court of Justice which had no operative
procedures. This resulted in undue delays
in Neptune’s access to justice. The Court
held that temporary release without any
formal documentation rendered Neptune
vulnerable to re-imprisonment and to reprisals from Haitian society.
The Court also found the state violated
Neptune’s rights to personal liberty within
Article 7 and his right to personal integrity
protected by Article 5. Under Article 7,
Neptune’s detention was illegal and arbitrary because it had been prescribed by a
court without jurisdiction. Additionally, he
was not adequately informed of the reasons
for his detention nor allowed to appear
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before a judge until 11 months after his
arrest. The unhygienic cells, restrictions
on movement, threats from guards and
other inmates, and the failure to prevent
escalation of violence resulting in a riot
that endangered Neptune’s life amounted
to Article 5 violations. Further, Haitian
officials held Neptune in the same cells as
convicted criminals, in direct contravention of Article 5.
The Court prescribed reparations,
including $95,000 in costs and damages
to be paid to Neptune. The Court ordered
Haiti to expeditiously decide the case
against Neptune, to set forth rules for the
High Court enabling it to be operative and
consistent with the Convention, and to
improve the conditions of detention facilities in line with international standards.

IACHR Decides First Case on Just
Compensation
On May 6, 2008, the Court decided
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, and ruled that the
Ecuadorian government had limited the
Chiribogas’ property rights (Article 21)
in contravention of the judicial protections (Articles 8 and 25) provided in the
American Convention on Human Rights.
In 1991, the Municipal Council of Quito
issued a declaration expropriating petitioners’ inherited land for public use as
the Parque Metropolitano, an area for
recreation and ecological protection. The
state possessed the land in 1997, rendering the petitioners unable to exercise their
rights to use and enjoy the property. The
state made a unilateral determination of
value contested by petitioners and rebuffed
by expert assessments. The determination
consequently gave rise to condemnation
proceedings that remained pending.
Ecuador contended that petitioners
failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The
Court found that petitioners instituted multiple actions in Ecuador to establish the
illegality of the declaration of public utility
on the basis that they received insufficient
notice and were subjected to discriminatory treatment in the targeting of their
land. An excessive amount of time passed
in which state courts failed to produce
definite rulings on the petitioners’ claims.
The Court also noted that the writ of
amparo, which would have offered petitioners protection from expropriation, had
been denied. Accordingly, petitioners had
exhausted domestic remedies.

Article 21 provides that the right to
property is not absolute and can be limited for reasons of public utility or social
interest where the owner is justly compensated and the expropriation is governed
by law. The Court found that the expropriation represented a reasonable limitation
because it was aimed at environmental
protection. The state’s unilateral assessment of property value, however, was not
a just compensation, and the condemnation
proceedings exceeded a reasonable time
period and were ineffective. Ecuador’s
failure to provide the judicial protections
of notice and effective remedy in relation
to the deprivation of property constituted a
violation of Articles 21, 8, and 25.
The judgment prescribed reparations,
including the provision of just compensation within six months, with the Court
reserving the right to award compensation
and costs if Ecuador was unable to do so
on its own.

Panama Responsible for 1970s
Disappearances
In its August 12, 2008 decision, the
Court found that the Panamanian government violated Heliodoro Portugal and his
family’s rights to personal liberty, humane
treatment, fair trial, and judicial protection
as delineated in the American Convention
on Human Rights. The Court also found
that Panama failed to criminalize forced
disappearance and to fulfill its obligation to criminalize torture as prescribed
by the Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearances of Persons and
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture, respectively. Portugal,
a suspected communist intellectual, was
abducted in 1970 and had remained missing for 30 years. After Panama’s transition
to democracy, Portugal’s daughter reported
the disappearance in 1990. Remains found
near military barracks in 2000 were determined to be those of Portugal.
Panama claimed inadmissibility due
to failure to exhaust domestic remedies,
asserting that family members never made
a direct accusation and that the investigation had been conducted without delay.
The Court found that the initiation of a
direct accusation was not a requirement,
and given Portugal’s disappearance over
30 years ago, there had been an unjustified
delay in the investigation. In response to
Panama’s assertion that the Court lacked
temporal jurisdiction, the Court held that
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it would be limited to those violations
occurring after May 1990 when Panama
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court.
Because Portugal was killed before this
time, the Court could not rule on the question of extrajudicial killing.
The Court could rule, however, on personal liberty, because the forced disappearance continued until 2000 when Portugal’s
remains were identified. The Court denied
Panama’s argument that the alleged disappearance and ill-treatment ended when Portugal was killed, prior to the recognition of
jurisdiction. The Court found that Panama
violated Article 7 from the moment it
accepted jurisdiction until the moment Portugal’s remains were identified. The Court
also found Panama violated the Article 5
right to humane treatment, holding that the
inactivity of state authorities, lack of effective investigation, and failure to sanction
those responsible violated the mental and
moral integrity of the family members.
In addition, the Court found Panama in
violation of procedural rights asserted in
Articles 8 and 25 and determined that
domestic recourses were ineffective in
guaranteeing access to justice, a thorough
investigation, and the sanctioning of those
responsible. No investigation occurred in
the 38 years that Portugal was missing.
During 18 of these years Panama, as a state
party to the Convention, was obligated
to investigate. It was unreasonable for
Panama to have allowed 18 years to pass
without investigating.
Although petitioners alleged violations
of freedom of thought and expression, the
Court held that familial access to information about what happened to Portugal was
not within the limits of Article 13. Due
to the timing of the disappearance, the
Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on
the ideological basis for disappearance. In
addition to material and immaterial damages, the Court ordered Panama to provide
free medical and psychological care to
the family members and to pay litigation
costs.			
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